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Audit opinion and earnings management: Evidence from Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between audit opinions and earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals, for listed firms on the Athens 
Stock Exchange (ASE). We divide the qualified audit opinions into two categories: 
qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. The results 
indicate that audit opinions are not related to earnings management. Client financial 
characteristics, such as profitability and size are determinants of the going-concern 
audit opinion decision. The decision of auditors to issue qualified opinions for other 
reasons is explained by the type of audit opinion issued in the previous year.  
 
Keywords: Audit opinion; Going-concern uncertainty; Discretionary accruals; IFRS 
context; Debt crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In recent years, Greece has experienced the effects of three major financial 
events that are worth investigating in the context of financial and auditor reporting. 
These events are the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) on publicly listed firms beginning on January 1, 2005, the global financial 
crisis that began in the US in 2007 and officially ended in 2009 and, most 
importantly, the Greek debt crisis. 
 The first signs of the European sovereign debt crisis became visible in Greece 
in 2009. Pre-existing conditions, such as the engagement of the government in 
substantial foreign borrowing and domestic overspending, the successive 
downgrading of government debt, the failure to implement consistent economic and 
structural reforms and the deterioration of macroeconomic indicators, undermined the 
ability of the country to prevent the shocks associated with the crisis. While Greece 
has received consecutive packages of rescue loans from the trilateral mechanism of 
financial support - the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the European Central Bank (ECB) - these rescue loans have been conditional on 
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the implementation of austerity measures and the restructuring of the Greek national 
debt.  
  Inevitably, financial crises have a direct effect on the business world. For 
example, liquidity and credit problems are intensified, and the threat of bankruptcy is 
even more pronounced. In turn, these threats have an impact on a number of parties 
related to affected firms. The economic and social costs of corporate failures are 
substantial to the suppliers of capital, that is, the investors and creditors, who may 
lose their investments, as well as to the management and employees, who may lose 
their jobs (Charitou, Lambertides, & Trigeorgis, 2007). In such a setting, there is a 
growing concern about the quality of the information provided in financial statements 
by managers, especially of financially distressed firms because their incentives to 
manage earnings are potentially magnified. At the same time, concerns over auditor 
reporting increase. Although auditors have incentives to remain independent,1 their 
willingness to report accounting deficiencies may lessen during crises. Auditors 
respond to incentives; when legal, regulatory or economic conditions are more 
tolerant for auditors, they are likely to issue less qualified opinions (Carson, Fargher, 
Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandan, & Willekens, 2012). Conversely, when there are 
changes that put the profession in the spotlight, the likelihood of issuing going-
concern qualified opinions is higher (Carson et al., 2012). 
Our aim is to investigate the association between auditor reporting, as 
measured by auditors’ willingness to issue qualified opinions, and earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals. The sample of the study consists 
of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) for the post-IFRS period 2005 to 
2011, a period incorporating the severe global and Greek economic downturn. First, 
we analyse the qualification types of all qualified audit opinions. Second, in the 
empirical investigation of our hypotheses, we divide the qualified opinions into two 
categories: qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. 
Finally, we test our hypotheses in a subsample of distressed firms based on the 
probability of greater incentives to manage earnings.2 
1Competence and independence are used to describe audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981). Competence is the ability of 
the auditor to detect material error in the financial statements, and independence from the client firm is the 
willingness of the auditor to take a position that opposes the wishes of the client and report the material error 
(DeAngelo, 1981). 
2 We extend the study of Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) by reporting an in-depth analysis of the different types of 
audit opinion qualifications. While they consider an audit opinion dummy variable that takes on the value of 0 for 
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This topic is important because the current economic environment reopens 
fundamental questions about the role of auditors in maintaining financial statement 
users’ confidence in the audit report. Therefore, it is vital to examine the association 
between audit opinion and earnings management in a situation where the propensity 
to manage earnings may be high. In addition, although audit qualifications and their 
determinants have been previously examined in the Greek context,3 it is the first time 
that the qualification types are extensively analysed for the period 2005 to 2011 and 
that the going-concern uncertainty is separated from the other qualifications in an 
empirical investigation of the audit opinion decision. 
 Overall, the results indicate that audit opinions are not related to earnings 
management. The variability in the going-concern decision is explained by client 
financial characteristics, such as profitability and firm size, audit effort and audit 
opinion type issued in the previous year. The economic downturn has affected the 
financial condition of firms, which is depicted in the type of audit opinion they 
receive. Additionally, the qualified audit opinion, for reasons other than the going-
concern uncertainty, is explained by the type of audit opinion issued in the previous 
year, both in the full and the distressed samples. Auditors do not consider client 
financial characteristics in their reporting decision, and prior year audit opinion is the 
only useful decision tool in predicting the current year’s opinion.  
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the 
Greek institutional setting of auditing. The literature review and hypotheses are 
presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the methodology, describes the sample, 
outlines the analysis of the audit opinion qualifications and presents the empirical 
model. Section 5 documents the results, while Section 6 presents the study’s 
conclusions.  
 
2. The institutional setting of auditing in Greece 
 
  Greece is a continental European country with many economic and socio-
political distinctive features. During the last three decades, Greece has been 
an unqualified opinion and 1 for a qualified opinion, irrespective of the qualification type, we measure audit 
opinions in a more disaggregated fashion. 
3 See for example Caramanis and Spathis (2006), Kirkos, Spathis, Nanopoulos, and Manolopoulos (2007), 
Koumanakos, Georgopoulos, and Siriopoulos (2008), Spathis (2003), Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis (2002) 
and Spathis, Doumpos, and Zopounidis (2003). 
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influenced by neo-liberal, free-market forces, but Greek culture, politics and 
economics remain a mixture of Eastern and Western influences (Caramanis, 2005).4 
Business organisations have been traditionally family oriented (Spanos, Tsipouri, & 
Xanthakis, 2008) and stakeholder driven, with poor legal protection for investors. 
Banks are major providers of corporate capital, and they often develop personal 
relationships with the firms (Tsovas, 2006). In this relationship-based system, banks 
may arrive at their credit decisions based on information obtained directly from the 
owners of the firms, thereby undermining the importance of public accounting 
information (Tzovas, 2006). The significant expansion of the Athens Stock Exchange 
(ASE) in the late 1990s turned many firms from private-family owned businesses to 
publicly listed entities (Spanos, 2005), without changing the existing relatively high 
levels of family ownership concentration (Lazarides, 2010). In addition, the expansion 
of the ASE, followed by the crash of 2000-2001 and the requirements of international 
capital providers raised the need for effective corporate governance. However, Greek 
listed firms are still not entirely accustomed to the philosophy of modern corporate 
governance (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010), which further diminishes the quality 
of accounting information available to the public.  
The Greek accounting setting is characterised as tax-driven and conservative 
(Ballas, 1994; Spathis & Georgakopoulou, 2007). As the corporate tax rate is 
perceived to be high, many firms attempt to avoid taxes using earnings management 
techniques (Baralexis, 2004). Furthermore, as financial statements are not the primary 
source of information for family concentrated firms, tax-reducing strategies may be 
implemented (Tzovas, 2006). With respect to the IFRS transition, Ballas, Skoutela 
and Tzovas (2010) argue that it has increased reliability, transparency and 
comparability of financial statements. In contrast, the results of Karampinis and 
Hevas (2011) indicate that only minor improvements are evidenced in value relevance 
and conditional conservatism. Ball (2006) questions the convergence efforts of 
financial reporting stating that EU economic rules are not implemented evenly, with 
some countries, including Greece, being well-known for their reluctance to comply 
with convergence initiatives.  
4 In 1980, to facilitate membership to the EU, Greece adopted a general accounting plan closely based on the 
French Plan Comptable Général, which was amended in 1987 and 1990 in accordance with the 4th and 7th EU 
Directives, respectively
 
(Ballas, 1994; Tsalavoutas & Evans, 2010). 
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 2.1. The audit market  
 
 In 1955, corporate auditing was introduced in Greece with the establishment 
of the Body of Chartered Accountants (SOL), which was state-regulated and entitled 
to significant privileges (Dedoulis & Caramanis, 2007). In 1992, the Greek auditing 
profession was liberalised, and SOL was transformed into a private audit firm, SOL 
S.A. A new public legal entity was then created, the Body of Certified Auditors and 
Accountants (SOEL), to regulate the audit profession.5 SOL S.A. has been the 
dominant audit firm despite several international and Greek audit firms entering the 
market, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young and KPMG, i.e., the ‘Big 4’, as well as approximately 20 Greek and second-
tier international audit firms. 
The effectiveness of the external audit function has been questioned by 
various parties, such as financial institutions, investors, journalists and politicians 
(Leventis, Weetman, & Caramanis, 2011). In 2003, the Greek Ministry of Economy 
established the Accounting and Auditing Oversight Board (ELTE) in response to the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002.6 However, as the enforcement mechanisms are 
still weak, there is low risk of litigation by third parties. These conditions do affect the 
quality of audit services as auditors may be tempted to behave opportunistically. 
The audit services industry profited with the transition of publicly listed firms 
from Greek accounting standards to the IFRS. The inclusion of reconciliation 
statements in the 2005 financial statements and the restatement of the 2004 accounts 
prepared under Greek GAAP to the IFRS increased the workload of auditors. In 2005, 
the market value for audit firm services was 137 million euros, an increase of 12% 
compared to 2004 (Hellastat, 2011). The annual growth rates for the next two years 
remained steadily high, i.e., 13.8% (2006) and 12.2% (2007), but eased to 6.2% in 
2008 and 3% in 2009 (Hellastat, 2011). 
 
5The functions of SOEL include the maintenance of the Registry of Auditors, the issuance of guidelines 
concerning the audit profession and the organisation and conduct of the professional exams for obtaining the 
license to practice as a certified public accountant (statutory auditor). 
6 ELTE has the mission to set up the auditing standards of listed and non-listed entities in accordance with law, to 
conduct inspections of mandatory audits, to advice the Ministry on issues relevant to accounting and auditing 
standards, to supervise SOEL and to enact codes of conduct for statutory auditors. 
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 2.2. Auditing standards 
 
 Greek auditing standards (GAS)7 converged with the objectives of the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and were developed 
according to the principles and requirements of the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA), as issued at the end of 2004. Thus, during the audit process and the 
issuance of the audit report, auditors were encouraged to use ISA as a frame of 
reference. In 2008, new regulation was introduced8 and audits were, thereafter,  
conducted in accordance with the clarified ISA, which applied to audits of financial 
statements for periods beginning on or after December 15, 2009. To facilitate the 
implementation of these standards, ELTE, with the assistance of SOEL, translated the 
clarified ISA into Greek, and it was approved by law in October 2012.9  
Consistent with GAS 7700, five types of audit opinion were issued in Greece: 
(i) unqualified, (ii) qualified with matters of emphasis, (iii) qualified with exceptions 
(or ‘except for’), (iv) disclaimer and (v) adverse.10 The going-concern uncertainty 
qualification is present in all types of qualified opinions, depending on the adequacy 
of disclosure and the severity of the uncertainty. Nevertheless, the decision to issue a 
going-concern opinion is complex and requires considerable amount of professional 
judgment (Carson, Fargher, Geiger, Lennox, Raghunandan, & Willekens, 2013). The 
audit report aims to enhance the degree of confidence of intended users in the 
financial statements, yet the auditor assumes responsibility only for the opinion that 
accompanies the report. The audit opinion is not a certificate, and the issuance of a 
going-concern qualification is by no means a prediction of bankruptcy (Chen & 
Church, 1996).  
 
3.  Literature review and hypotheses  
7 Decision no.483/6.10.2004 (Government Gazette 1589/B/2004). 
8 Law 3693/2008 ‘Harmonization of Greek legislation with Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits of annual 
accounts and consolidated accounts’ (Government Gazette 174/A/2008). 
9 Decision no.41658/722/1.10.2012 ‘Approval and validity of ISA translated in Greek’ (Government Gazette 
2848/Β/2012). 
10 After the adoption of the clarified ISA, the types of audit opinions, according to ISA 700, are as follows:  
unmodified, qualified (or ‘except for’), adverse and disclaimer. ISA 700 uses the term ‘qualified’ as synonymous 
with ‘except for’. Also, the emphasis of matter paragraph is placed after the opinion paragraph (ISA 706); ISA 706 
indicates that the auditor’s report is not modified with respect to the matters addressed in this paragraph. To enable 
our analysis, we apply the GAS 7700 categorisation to the audit opinions of 2010 and 2011, which does not differ 
substantially from ISA 700. 
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  Our study revisits the potential link between earnings management and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. Prior studies, mostly from the US, provide 
mixed evidence on the nature of this relationship. Francis and Krishnan (1999), using 
a large sample of US listed firms and after controlling for client-specific financial and 
market risk variables, find that auditors of firms with high levels of accruals in 
absolute terms are more likely to issue qualified opinions for asset realisation 
uncertainties and for going-concern problems, than auditors of firms with low 
absolute levels of accruals. This relationship is stronger for firms with large negative 
accruals. Similarly, Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2001), in a study examining the ability of 
various accruals models to detect earnings management, find that a significant 
positive link exists between the absolute value of discretionary accruals and the 
likelihood of receiving a qualified opinion. However, this relationship is significant 
for only two of the models tested - the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model and the 
cross-sectional modified Jones (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) model. Finally, 
Sengupta and Shen (2007) re-examine this issue and indicate that the likelihood of 
receiving a going-concern audit opinion is higher when the quality of accruals for a 
firm is low.11 
 By contrast, Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan (2001) find no evidence that 
the frequency of qualified audit opinions is higher in firms with sizeable accruals. 
They conclude that auditors do not alert investors to the increased incidence of future 
earnings declines and GAAP violations that are often associated with high levels of 
accruals on a timely basis. The rationale is that such earnings quality issues are 
beyond the scope of the audit. In other words, auditors may understand that inflated 
accruals imply a greater likelihood of future earnings declines and GAAP violations, 
but they are not required to communicate this information to investors through their 
audit opinions. Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004) support this view and conclude 
that auditors are unlikely to issue qualified opinions for earnings-management 
reasons. More specifically, based on over 7000 qualified opinions of US firms for the 
11 They use three measures of accruals quality, which are estimated based on the model of Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) with modifications suggested by McNichols (2002) and Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2005), and 
capture the extent to which working capital accruals of a period are not explained by the current period, previous 
period or next period operating cash flows. 
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period 1994-1999, they examine the relationship between abnormal accruals and audit 
opinion type. They find a positive association between modified opinions and 
abnormal accruals, when accruals are measured in absolute terms. When they change 
the dependent variable from the absolute level to the actual amount of abnormal 
accruals, they discover that qualified opinions are negatively related to accruals. They 
attribute this negative association to the fact that firms with large negative accruals 
tend to receive GC opinions, which are motivated more by their distressed status and 
not by earnings management. Overall, they find no evidence that auditors use the 
audit opinions to alert financial statement users of either excessive earnings 
management or the consequences of high levels of positive accruals.  
 The above studies are conducted in the US. Few investigations from countries 
with different institutional settings and auditor reporting regimes have investigated 
this issue. Herbohn and Ragunathan (2008) investigate whether a negative association 
exists between actual abnormal accruals and the probability of receiving a qualified 
audit opinion in Australia. They focus on a sample of firms listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange over the period 1999-2003. Consistent with Butler et al. (2004), they 
document a negative link between the likelihood of a qualified opinion and accruals 
that is driven by going-concern issues for firms with a greater risk of financial distress 
and audit litigation. Their results suggest that earnings management is not the cause of 
audit opinion qualifications. 
Arnedo, Lizarraga, and Sanchez (2008) test this relationship in a Spanish 
context for a sample of private pre-bankrupt firms. They separate the qualified 
opinions into two groups – qualified based on going-concern issues and qualified for 
other reasons. Their evidence, consistent with Butler et al. (2004), reveals a negative 
association, which stems from reports containing uncertainty about the likelihood of a 
firm continuing as a going-concern. A positive relationship is found, however, when 
the reasons for the qualification are other than the going-concern. Unlike Butler et al. 
(2004), they claim that auditor reporting is a positive response to earnings 
management and that the negative relationship in going-concern cases is a 
consequence of auditor conservatism rather than a result of the distressed status of the 
firm and its liquidity tactics for survival.   
 The inconclusive evidence of prior studies raises a question regarding the 
association between earnings management and the issuance of a qualified audit 
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opinion in Greece. In contrast to the US, where most audit reports are qualified based 
on the going-concern uncertainty, Greek qualified audit reports are frequently issued 
for reasons other than going-concern. This implies that auditors have the opportunity 
to convey different warning signals to users of the financial statements. As Lam and 
Mensah (2006) state, it is an empirical question of whether auditors, when granted a 
greater degree of flexibility by both a more limited litigation-risk environment and the 
option to issue a wider range of audit reports, attempt to convey more information to 
the public. In an effort to examine this relationship in detail, we divide qualified 
opinions into two categories – qualified based on the going-concern uncertainty and 
qualified for reasons other than the going-concern uncertainty. Our hypotheses, stated 
in the null form, are as follows: 
 
H1. Qualified audit opinions for going-concern uncertainty are not associated 
with discretionary accruals, other things being equal. 
H2. Qualified audit opinions for reasons other than the going-concern uncertainty 
are not associated with discretionary accruals, other things being equal.  
 
 Following prior research (Boone, Khurana, & Raman, 2010; Carey & Simnett, 
2006; DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002; Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007; 
Mutchler, Hopwood, & McKeown, 1997; Reynolds & Francis, 2000), we also test 
these hypotheses in a subsample of financially distressed firms. The motivation for 
this derives from the rising concern about the quality of the information provided in 
financial statements by managers, especially of financially distressed firms, in periods 
of tough economic conditions; in these circumstances, managers may have greater 
incentives to manage earnings.  
 Prior research suggests that managers of distressed firms have incentives for 
both earnings overstatements and understatements, both of which increase the 
probability of misrepresentation in financial statements. When managers are 
concerned with the short-term survival of their firm, they may report higher earnings 
to avoid debt covenant violations and the threat of bankruptcy (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 
1994; Dichev & Skinner, 2002; Sweeney, 1994), while Schwartz (1982) argues that 
managers of distressed firms use accounting tactics to strengthen earnings per share to 
retain investor confidence. Additionally, managers of financially distressed firms may 
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adjust earnings upwards out of self-interest. To avoid management turnover during 
the distressed period, they may temporarily inflate the market price to increase their 
compensation or gain from cashing in stock-based compensation holdings (Charitou 
et al., 2007).  
Conversely, managers may voluntarily reduce reported earnings. DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner (1994) find that 87% of their sample of listed firms with 
persistent losses and dividend reductions engage in contractual renegotiations with 
lenders, unions, government and/or management. These renegotiations motivate 
managers to reduce reported earnings to convince labour unions or government 
authorities that the company is truly troubled and deserves wage concessions and 
government assistance. Jaggi and Lee (2002), in their study of financially distressed 
firms in the US, find that managers use income decreasing discretionary accruals if 
debt restructuring takes place or debts are renegotiated because waivers are denied. 
Finally, a decrease in earnings may be the result of the declining financial 
performance of the firm and its liquidity survival tactics and not necessarily the result 
of earnings manipulation (Butler et al., 2004). 
 The role of auditors in an economic downturn, characterised by increased 
client financial distress, is also mixed (Ettredge, Li, & Emeigh, 2011). International 
evidence reveals that auditors respond to these conditions by being more conservative 
in their reporting decisions, i.e., they are more willing to issue qualified opinions of 
going-concern uncertainty. Even in the less strict institutional environment of Greece, 
auditors may become more conservative due to the debt crisis. The international 
attention and criticism towards the auditing profession as well as litigation threats that 
may arise during this period are some of the reasons for increased conservatism. 
Fargher and Jiang (2008) show that auditors became more conservative in the 
aftermath of high-profile corporate failures occurring in the period 2000-2002. 
Additionally, reporting conservatism can be thought of as a response by auditors to 
their inability to assess the accuracy of reported accruals and the potential effect that 
accruals may have on the going-concern assumption (Francis & Krishnan, 1999).  
On the other hand, auditor dependence may be more apparent during these 
periods because auditors’ revenues are also decreased and their need to retain clients 
is stronger (Ettredge et al., 2011). Additionally, managers may pressure auditors with 
the threat of dismissal not to issue going-concern opinions due to the economic costs 
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of this decision. The potential negative signal of a going-concern qualification could 
lead to the deterioration of an already distressed firm and increase the probability of 
failure, as suggested by the self-fulfilling prophecy (Guiral, Ruiz, & Rodgers, 2011). 
Consequently, the audit-client relationship has received renewed interest, and the role 
of auditors in ensuring that financial statements do not contain misleading information 
is more relevant than ever. Our hypotheses for the distressed sample are as follows: 
 
H3. Qualified audit opinions for going-concern uncertainty are not associated 
with discretionary accruals for distressed firms, other things being equal. 
H4. Qualified audit opinions for reasons other than the going-concern uncertainty 
are not associated with discretionary accruals for distressed firms, other 
things being equal.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Sample  
 
 The initial sample consists of firms listed on the ASE. The sample period 
begins in 2005 and ends in 2011. It therefore spans three notable events of 
international importance - the mandatory adoption of the IFRS, the global financial 
crisis that began in 2007, and the European sovereign debt crisis that followed. We 
excluded firms in the financial, insurance and real estate sectors as their financial 
structure is not comparable to those of other industries and their discretionary accruals 
estimation is problematic (DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). Additionally, we omitted 
sectors with less than ten firms in a year for the estimation of discretionary accruals. 
As a result, our sample included firms from the following 9 sectors: metals, 
construction and materials of construction, food and beverages, travelling and leisure, 
information technology, communication, trade, personal and domestic products, and 
industrial products and services.  
 The above selection procedure yielded 1479 firm-year observations for the 
analysis of the audit report qualifications. Data from audit reports were collected from 
the ASE online database. When not available in the database, we gathered all the 
required auditor information from the annual reports of the relevant firms. We then 
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manually recorded the coding of the opinions in a spreadsheet, following GAS 7700. 
To ensure the objective identification of our coding, the 509 qualified opinions 
detected were read by more than one researcher and recoded when necessary.  
 Data availability for the estimation of discretionary accruals and the test and 
control variables used in the hypotheses testing reduced the sample size from 1479 to 
1467 firm-year observations. Firms without a complete seven-year dataset were not 
excluded from the analysis, thus resulting in a different number of observations for 
each of the seven years. Annual financial statement data were provided by Hellastat 
S.A.12 To reduce the impact of outlier observations on the results, we winsorised 
observations that fell in the top and bottom 1% of the empirical distribution of the 
continuous variables (Chi & Chin, 2011; Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002). Regarding the 
financially distressed subsample, we restricted the analysis to situations where client 
firms exhibited negative cash flows from operations and/or negative net income 
during the current fiscal year, thus resulting in the identification of 845 firm-year 
observations.13  
 
4.2. Analysis of qualified audit opinions  
 
We analysed the qualified opinions in our sample to fully capture the details of 
the audit qualifications. According to Butler et al. (2004), the large-sample analysis of 
audit qualifications facilitates a detailed re-examination of the audit opinion and 
accounting accruals relation, which is investigated in the empirical section of this 
study. As Table 1 indicates, from a total of 1479 audit opinions, 65.6% were 
unqualified and 31% were qualified with matters of emphasis. Interestingly, the year 
2010 is a break point. While the number of unqualified opinions steadily increases 
12 Hellastat S.A. is a member of the European Association of Database & Directories Publishers and the World 
Association of Opinion & Marketing Research Professionals. It holds a database of business information that 
covers the economic activity in Greece and the Balkans. It is also a partner of Standard & Poor's and Thomson-
Reuters plc. 
13 There is not a generally accepted definition of financial distress. Mutchler et al. (1997) consider a company to be 
in financial distress if it exhibits at least one of the following criteria: (i) negative working capital in the last 
financial statements issued before bankruptcy, (ii) a loss from operations or a bottom-line loss in any of the three 
years prior to bankruptcy, or (iii) negative retained earnings in the current or previous two years. For the purposes 
of this study, we adopt the selection criteria of negative cash flows from operations and/or negative net income 
proposed by previous studies (Boone et al., 2010; Carey & Simnett, 2006; DeFond et al., 2002; Reynolds & 
Francis, 2000) as an indication of financial distress. By the end of the research period, i.e., 2011, approximately 
60% of the 2005 companies that were identified as financially distressed, were either deleted or under 
suspension/surveillance in the ASE.   
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and almost doubles for the period 2005 to 2009, in 2010 the trend diverts. Similarly, 
the matters-of-emphasis opinions decrease significantly, from 134 in 2005 to 24 in 
2009. Then, in 2010, they follow an upward trend. In 2010, we also detect the first 
disclaimer of opinion. Although there are a limited number of disclaimer opinions, 
they provide an indication of the effect of the debt crisis on firms. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 Table 2 provides a detailed analysis of all qualifications for the seven-year 
period. It is clear that, while there are 509 qualified audit opinions in the sample, as 
shown in Table 1, we observe 822 audit qualifications in Table 2. The difference of 
313 represents opinions with multiple qualifications. The most common qualification 
is the uncertain outcome of future tax audits (38.5%), especially for the period from 
2005 to 2007. Under this qualification, firms do not make adequate provisions nor do 
they have any provisions for the unaudited fiscal years. Hence, there is potential for 
additional taxes and penalties. Additionally, a sum of 239 qualifications (29.1%), as 
expressed in the three types of qualified audit opinions, are related to going-concern 
uncertainty issues. The occurrence of this qualification steadily increases over the 
sample period, and in 2011, it reaches a peak. This may be attributable to the global 
financial crisis and the first visible signs of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. As 
Carson, Simnett, and Trønnes (2011) state, auditors responded to the financial crisis 
by paying greater attention to going-concern issues. Accordingly, they increased the 
number of opinions qualified for going-concern uncertainty during 2008 in countries 
such as the UK, Australia and France (Carson et al., 2011). 
(Table 2 about here) 
 The findings of the analysis in Table 2 reveal very few instances of GAAP 
departures or scope limitations and, similar to Butler et al. (2004), provide little 
support for the rationale that qualified audit opinions suggest the presence of extreme 
earnings management. In the following sections, we empirically investigate this 
relationship, as undetected earnings management may still exist. Undetected earnings 
management refers to instances where earnings management occurs, but there is no 
obvious event that would reveal its occurrence to the public (Marquardt & Wiedman, 
2004). 
 
4.3. Estimation of discretionary accruals 
14 
 
 
 Although accruals can be observed, it is very difficult to identify what portion 
is being managed to move profits toward a desired level of earnings. Some accrual 
adjustments are necessary and expected by investors, which constitute the non-
discretionary component of accruals, while the remaining accruals are not dictated by 
firm conditions but are rather managed and termed discretionary (Charitou et al., 
2007). We estimate discretionary accruals using an extension of the Jones (1991) 
model. We employ the cross-sectional modified Jones model, proposed by Dechow et 
al. (1995), which is designed to increase the precision of the original model and 
eliminate its hypothesised tendency to measure discretionary accruals with error, 
when managerial discretion is exercised over revenues. Dechow et al. (1995) argue 
that earnings can be managed through discretionary revenues by recording these 
revenues at year end, when the cash has not yet been received. Total accruals are then 
affected through an increase in receivables. Thus, they suggest that when estimating 
the non-discretionary accruals, we must deduct the change in receivables, which is 
assumed to be discretionary, from the total change in revenues, as follows: 
 
TAit/Ait-1   = β0 + β1t (1/Ait-1) + β2t ((ΔREVit - ΔRECit) / Ait-1) + β3t (PPEit /Ait-1) + εit    (1)                                                                                
 
where for firm i year t, TAit is the total accruals14; Ait-1 is the total assets (year t-1); 
ΔREVit  is the change in net revenues from year t-1 to year t; ΔRECit is the change in 
net accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; PPEit is the property, plant and 
equipment; εit is the random error term. 
 The estimated discretionary accruals (DA) are the difference between actual 
total accruals and the fitted values of the accruals from model 1. A higher level of 
discretionary accruals, positive or negative, indicates a greater level of earnings 
management.  
 
4.4 Empirical model  
 
 We test our hypotheses of whether the audit opinion decision is related to 
earnings management by estimating a logistic regression model where the type of 
14 Total accruals are calculated using the cash flow approach proposed by Hribar and Collins (2002) as an 
alternative to the balance sheet approach and defined as operating income minus operating cash flows. 
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audit opinion (AO) is the dependent dichotomous variable and discretionary accruals 
(DA) is the test variable. We divide qualified opinions into the following two 
categories (according to Arnedo et al., 2008): (i) qualified for the going-concern 
uncertainty (GC) for Hypotheses 1 and 3 testing, and (ii) qualified for reasons other 
than the going-concern uncertainty (NGC) for Hypotheses 2 and 4 testing. This model 
is specified below: 
 
AOit  = β0 + β1DAit + β2BIGNit + β3ROAit + β4TURNit + β5INVRECit + β6TLEit + 
β7ZMJit + β8ARLAGit + β9AGEit + β10LAOit-1 + β11LLOSSit-1 + εit                    (2)                                                                                  
 
where for firm i at year t, 
 
Dependent variable: 
AOit   = type of audit opinion received by the client: 
        i) GCit = 1 if the audit opinion includes a going-concern qualification, 
0 otherwise. 
ii) NGCit = 1 if the audit opinion includes qualifications except for the 
going-concern uncertainty, 0 otherwise. 
Test variable:  
DAit                 = discretionary accruals estimated using model (1). 
Control variables:  
BIGNit     = dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is a member of the 
Big 4, 0 otherwise. 
ROAit                     = net income divided by total assets. 
TURNit = total sales divided by total assets. 
INVRECit = inventory and accounts receivables divided by total assets. 
TLEit = total liabilities divided by total equity. 
ZMJit = Zmijewski’s financial condition score (1984). 15 
ARLAGit   = natural logarithm of time lag (in days) between fiscal year 
end and the date of the audit report issue. 
15 Zmj = - 4.336 - 4.512 x (net income/total assets) + 5.679 x (total liabilities/total assets) + 0.004 x (current 
assets/current liabilities). Higher values represent a higher risk of bankruptcy. 
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AGEit = natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was 
listed on the ASE. 
LAOit-1 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the client received a qualified 
opinion in the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
LLOSSit-1 = dummy variable equal to 1 if the client experienced loss in 
the previous year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 To form the dependent variable (AO), we examined the opinion and 
explanatory paragraphs of all qualified audit reports. When an opinion included 
multiple qualifications and at least one of them addressed a going-concern problem, 
then this opinion was classified as a going-concern (GC). The remaining qualified 
audit opinions were collectively referred to as qualified for other reasons (NGC). A 
more detailed classification of the qualified opinions may have been possible, based 
on their nature and severity (Bradshaw et al., 2001). However, the number of ‘except 
for’ and ‘adverse’ opinions in our sample was too small to draw any statistical 
inferences if treated separately.    
We control for variables that have been identified in prior literature as they are 
likely to affect the audit opinion decision. Variables describing both client factors, 
those related to financial health, such as profitability, liquidity, solvency and 
operating risk, and auditor factors are retained to form our model (Boone et al., 2010; 
Bradshaw et al., 2001; Butler et al., 2004; Carcello & Neal, 2000; Carey & Simnett, 
2006; Chan, Lin, & Mo, 2006; Chen, Sun & Wu, 2010; Choi, Doogar, & Ganguly, 
2004; Craswell, Stokes, & Laughton, 2002; Defond et al., 2002; DeFond, Wong, & 
Li, 2000; Dopuch, Holthausen, & Leftwich, 1987; Ettredge et al., 2011; Francis, 
2004; Francis & Yu, 2009; Gaeremynck, Van Der Meulen, & Willekens, 2008; 
Geiger & Rama, 2006; Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 2005; Louwers, 1998; Mutchler, 
1985; Mutchler et al., 1997; Reichelt & Wang, 2010; Reynolds & Francis, 2000).  
The selected variables are expected to have similar effects on both types of 
audit qualifications, GC and NGC, with some exceptions. Ireland (2003) argues that 
this is the reason why it is important to distinguish between going-concern and non-
going-concern related qualifications. First, TURN is predicted to have a negative sign 
for going-concern qualified opinions, but it can have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of a firm receiving a non-going-concern related audit opinion as larger 
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firms are more complex, thereby increasing the likelihood of misstatements in the 
accounts (Ireland, 2003). Second, the impact of TLE cannot be predicted for non 
going-concern opinions. On the one hand, higher levels of debt may increase the 
probability of falsified financial statements, resulting in the issue of a qualified 
opinion (Spathis, 2003). On the other hand, high values of this variable may indicate 
that a low value of total assets and a high value of total liabilities is correctly stated, 
thereby decreasing the likelihood of qualifications (Ireland, 2003). Finally, Arnedo et 
al. (2008) report contradictory results for the ZMJ variable. While a positive 
relationship is supported for the going-concern model, a negative relationship is found 
in the non-going-concern model. They attribute this to the fact that firms receiving 
non-going-concern qualifications are related to situations of lower financial weakness, 
which is consistent with their less compromising character. That is, because managers 
of these firms may not agree with the judgment of the auditors, they receive qualified 
opinions.  
 
5. Empirical analysis  
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics and tests for difference in means for the 
continuous variables used in the study. We divide the sample of qualified audit 
opinions into two categories - qualified for the going-concern uncertainty and 
qualified for other reasons. We then examine and compare the values for the variables 
against those for firms with unqualified audit opinions. The subset of firms with 
going-concern opinions differs significantly from the other two subsets, with mean 
differences statistically significant at the 1% level for all variables except for 
INVREC and TLE. A more detailed investigation reveals that in the going-concern 
subset, total accruals and the main variable of interest, discretionary accruals, are, on 
average, negative (TA mean = -0.060 and DA mean = -0.047). Negative discretionary 
accruals imply a tendency to underestimate accruals and thus result in management of 
earnings in the downward direction. In the same subset of going-concern qualified 
opinions, ROA (mean = -0.267) and TURN (mean= 0.319) are lower, while ZMJ 
(mean = 2.019) is higher relative to the other two subsets, indicating that firms with 
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going-concern qualifications are less profitable, smaller in size and in greater financial 
difficulty than firms without such qualifications. Finally, firms in the going-concern 
uncertainty category have longer delays in the issuance of the audit opinion (ARLAG 
mean = 1.963).  
(Table 3 about here) 
 Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics of the discrete variables BIGN, 
LAO and LLOSS. From the 171 firms with going-concern opinions, 154 are audited 
by non-Big 4, 128 received a qualified opinion in the previous year and 125 reported 
losses in the previous year. The differences in means between firms receiving going-
concern opinions and firms with unqualified opinions are significant at the 1% level. 
Differences between firms with non-going-concern qualified opinions and unqualified 
opinions are statistically significant at the 1% level, with the exception of the LLOSS 
variable.16 
 (Table 4 about here) 
 
5.2. Regression results - full sample 
 
 Hypotheses 1 and 2 test the association between earnings management as 
measured by discretionary accruals (DA) and the audit opinion decision: (i) the 
propensity to issue a going-concern qualified opinion (GC) and (ii) the propensity to 
issue a qualified opinion, other than going-concern (NGC), respectively. The results 
of the logistic regressions are presented in Table 5. The signs of the statistically 
significant coefficients are in the expected directions. 
(Table 5 about here) 
 We are primarily concerned with the sign and significance of the coefficient 
β1. In the GC analysis, DA is not significant. This means that the null of Hypothesis 1 
is accepted as the DA variable does not explain the issuance of going-concern audit 
opinions. The variability in the going-concern opinion decision is better explained by 
16 Pearson and Spearman correlation analysis is also performed to obtain preliminary information of the 
relationships among the independent continuous variables of model 2. Significant correlations exist between a few 
pairs of independent variables, ZMJ and TLE (Spearman 0.785), ZMJ and ROA (Pearson -0.599) and TURN and 
INVREC (Spearman 0.575) at the 5% significance level. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we estimate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) scores of the independent variables to establish that the logistic regression model does not present 
multicollinearity issues.  
 
19 
 
                                                          
other financial and auditor characteristics, i.e., ROA, TURN, ZMJ, ARLAG, LAO 
and LLOSS, which are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 More precisely, the coefficients of ROA and TURN have, as predicted, 
negative signs (consistent with Chen et al., 2010; Ryu & Roh, 2007). A lower ROA 
indicates that decreasing profitability increases the probability of a going-concern 
qualification. Similarly, the negative coefficient of TURN suggests that the smaller 
the size of the client, in terms of sales, the greater the probability of receiving a 
qualified opinion for going-concern issues. ZMJ and LLOSS are statistically 
significant at the 1% level with positive coefficients, which is consistent with 
previous studies (Boone et al., 2010; Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chan et al., 2006; Chen 
et al., 2010; Chi & Chin, 2011; Craswell et al., 2002; DeFond et al., 2002, 2000). The 
positive coefficient of the ZMJ variable implies that clients with a greater 
susceptibility to failure have an increased chance of receiving a going-concern 
opinion. Because ZMJ is specified for the current period, LLOSS indicates that firms 
with prior year losses are also more likely to fail, increasing the probability of 
receiving going-concern qualified opinions. The positive and significant coefficient of 
LAO implies that the issuance of a qualified opinion in the previous year increases the 
probability of issuance of a qualified opinion in the current year, because conditions 
that generate uncertainty in a particular year are likely to persist in subsequent years 
(Boone et al., 2010; Carcello & Neal, 2000; Chen et al., 2010; Chi & Chin, 2011; 
Choi et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2002; Francis & Yu, 2009). Finally, the positive 
coefficient of ARLAG indicates that auditors spend more time and effort in their audit 
task before they issue a qualified opinion for going-concern issues (Francis & Yu, 
2009; Geiger & Rama, 2006; Ireland, 2003; Louwers, 1998; Ryu & Roh, 2007). The 
pseudo R2 shows that the independent variables explain 66.7% of the variation in 
issuing going-concern qualified opinions. VIF scores are within acceptable limits 
(Gujarati, 2008; Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2009; Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, 
& Li, 2004), with the largest score being 1.815, which suggests that multicollinearity 
is not an issue in interpreting the results. 
In the NGC analysis, the major determinant of the qualification decision is 
LAO, i.e., the type of audit opinion issued in the previous year, which is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The DA coefficient is negative and significant 
at the 10% level, thus the null of Hypothesis 2 is marginally rejected. The negative 
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sign implies that when firms with no going-concern problems use income-increasing 
discretionary accruals, they are more likely to receive unqualified audit opinions. 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) argue that auditors interpret the higher earnings associated 
with higher accruals as a positive sign and are less likely to issue qualified opinions in 
such cases. The explanatory power of the model is satisfactory and explains much of 
the dependent variable, with a pseudo R2 of 43%. Again, the VIF scores are within 
acceptable limits. 
 
5.3. Regression results - distressed sample 
 
 The results for the subsample of 845 firm-year observations that are classified 
as financially distressed are shown in Table 6 and are similar to those reported in 
Table 5. In the GC analysis, as the estimate of the coefficient β1 is not significant, the 
null of Hypothesis 3 is accepted. Audit opinions are unrelated to the level of 
discretionary accruals. The going-concern audit opinion decision for financially 
distressed firms is explained by ROA, TURN, ZMJ, ARLAG and LAO, which are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Auditors are more likely to issue going-
concern opinions for small distressed firms and for firms that received a qualified 
opinion in the previous year. Additionally, distressed clients with higher values for the 
ZMJ score have a higher probability of receiving a going-concern opinion. The 
ARLAG has a greater coefficient (β8 = 10.081) than in the full sample, which suggests 
that auditors of distressed firms spend more time conducting their audits when a GC 
audit opinion is likely. Several reasons could explain this result. First, auditors may 
engage in lengthy negotiations with management over the type of audit report, 
especially if a disagreement arises (Ireland, 2003; Ryu & Roh, 2007). Second, 
auditors may have discovered problems that require additional audit work. Finally, 
and especially with the going-concern opinion, auditors may delay finalising their 
report in the hope that the problems will be resolved and thus a qualified opinion will 
be avoided (Ireland, 2003; Ryu & Roh, 2007). The pseudo R2 of 63.2% is slightly 
lower than in the previous analysis.    
In the NGC analysis, the null of Hypothesis 4 is accepted. Auditors do not 
consider client financial characteristics in the reporting decision and LAO is, as in the 
full sample, the only statistically significant variable, at 1%. The issuance of a 
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qualified opinion in the previous year increases the auditor’s propensity to issue a 
qualified opinion in the current year unless the financial condition of the distressed 
firm improves (Carcello & Neal, 2000; Chen et al., 2010; Chi & Chin, 2011; Craswell 
et al., 2002; Francis & Yu, 2009; Mutchler, 1985; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; Ryu & 
Roh, 2007). The explanatory power of the model is satisfactory and explains much of 
the dependent variable, with a pseudo R2 of 39.6%. The VIF scores are within 
acceptable limits. 17 
(Table 6 about here) 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
 The primary objective of this study is to investigate auditor reporting, which is 
measured by the auditor’s propensity to issue a qualified audit opinion, and its 
association with earnings management, which is measured by discretionary accruals. 
In the examination of whether discretionary accruals increase a firm’s likelihood of 
receiving a qualified audit opinion, we utilise a sample of firms listed on the ASE for 
the post-IFRS period from 2005 to 2011, a period which includes the global financial 
crisis and the Greek sovereign debt problem. To provide an in-depth analysis of this 
relationship, we first analyse all qualified opinions of our sample. As with Butler et al. 
(2004), the findings reveal notably few instances of GAAP departures or scope 
limitations and provide little support for the presence of extreme earnings 
management. We then proceed to the empirical investigation of the hypotheses. On 
this basis, we divide the qualified opinions into the following two categories: 
qualified because of the going-concern uncertainty and qualified for other reasons. As 
an additional analysis, we test our hypotheses in a subsample of distressed firms due 
17 To enhance the validity of the results in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we performed a series of sensitivity tests. First, we 
examined the assumption for the formation of the GC variable, where qualified opinions with a going-concern 
qualification were categorised as GC, irrespective of the presence of other qualifications. We identified 91 audit 
opinions in our sample, which were qualified purely for going-concern uncertainty issues, and re-estimated model 
2. The results were broadly consistent with the empirical analysis of the full sample. Second, we estimated model 2 
using alternative discretionary accruals models: (i) the Jones model (1991), (ii) the modified-Jones model with 
prior-year ROA (Kothari et al., 2005) and (iii) the modified-Jones model with CFO (Larcker & Richardson, 2004). 
The results of hypotheses testing were similar to those reported in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, with the DA variable being 
again marginally significant, suggesting that our main findings are not sensitive to the different ways of estimating 
discretionary accruals. Finally, we estimated model 2 by omitting the ZMJ variable, because it was highly 
correlated with some variables of our model. The results again remained unaltered.  
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to the potentially magnified incentives that such firms may have to manage their 
earnings.  
The results provide evidence that the going-concern qualification decision is 
not related to the level of discretionary accruals, both in the full and in the distressed 
samples (Butler et al., 2004; Herbohn & Ragunathan, 2008). Auditors do not alert 
investors to the potential future problems experienced by firms with high 
discretionary accruals because they do not incorporate information in accruals into 
their opinions (Bradshaw et al., 2001). The variability in the going-concern decision is 
better explained by financial characteristics. Poor financial performance in the current 
fiscal year, prior year losses, audit opinion type received in the previous year, small 
firm size and greater audit effort result in a higher probability of receiving a going-
concern opinion. It appears that the economic downturn has affected the financial 
health of firms by impacting the type of audit opinion received. This is supported by 
Table 2, where it is illustrated that the number of going-concern qualifications has 
increased significantly in 2010 and 2011. In examining the opinions that are qualified 
for other reasons, we provide support for the argument that auditors do not seem to 
consider client financial characteristics in their reporting decision. The type of audit 
opinion issued in the previous year is the only useful decision tool in predicting the 
current year’s opinion, both in the full and the distressed samples.  
 The results of the present study should be treated with caution. Our inferences 
are driven by our proxies for auditor reporting and earnings management. These 
proxies are not perfect because they are formed using publicly available information, 
rather than private information known to the two key parties in the auditor-client 
relationship - auditors and managers. The auditing theory creates an abstracted reality, 
or ‘black box’, which does not sufficiently describe what is actually occurring 
(Beattie, Fearnley, & Brandt, 2000). Finally, the Greek post-IFRS period of economic 
recession provides a fruitful environment for further investigation. Future empirical 
research could explore the level of audit and non-audit fees and how these fees are 
affected by the debt crisis. There are increasing concerns that audit fee reductions 
during financial crises may lead to lower audit effort and lower audit quality 
(Krishnan & Zhang, 2013).   
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Table 1 
 Audit opinion type by year.  
Audit opinion type 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Unqualified opinion 86 38.0% 115 50.4% 126 57.0% 174 80.9% 177 86.7% 164 82.0% 128 69.2% 970 65.6% 
Qualified opinion:                 
Matters of emphasis 134 59.3% 104 45.6% 86 38.9% 34 15.8% 24 11.8% 30 15.0% 47 25.4% 459 31.0% 
With exception/s 6 2.7% 4 1.8% 6 2.7% 6 2.8% 3 1.5% 4 2.0% 7 3.8% 36 2.4% 
Adverse 0 0.0% 5 2.2% 3 1.4% 1 0.5% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 11 0.8% 
Disclaimer 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 2 1.1% 3 0.2% 
Total qualified opinions 140 62.0% 113 49.6% 95 43.0% 41 19.1% 27 13.3% 36 18.0% 57 30.8% 509 34.4% 
Total audit opinions 226 100.0% 228 100.0% 221 100.0% 215 100.0% 204 100.0% 200 100.0% 185 100.0% 1479 100.0% 
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Table 2 
Analysis of the qualifications in audit opinions for the period 2005-2011. 
 Audit opinion qualifications 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Matters of emphasis                         
Uncertain outcome of lawsuits 9 4.0% 8 4.3% 7 5.1% 6 7.8% 7 14.0% 3 4.9% 4 4.6% 44 5.3% 
Going-concern uncertainty (GCU) 21 9.4% 18 9.8% 15 10.9% 28 36.4% 24 48.0% 39 63.9% 48 54.5% 193 23.5% 
Uncertain outcome of future tax audits  110 49.1% 102 55.4% 86 62.3% 11 14.2% 4 8.0% 2 3.4% 1 1.1% 316 38.5% 
Other reasons 75 33.5% 26 14.2% 8 5.8% 6 7.8% 4 8.0% 6 9.9% 19 21.6% 144 17.5% 
Total qualifications, within category 215 96.0% 154 83.7% 116 84.1% 51   66.2% 39 78.0%     50 82.1%  72 81.8% 697 84.8% 
       
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
    
With exception/s                  
Scope limitations 0 0.0% 2 1.1% 4 2.9% 3 3.9% 4 8.0% 2 3.3% 2 2.3% 17 2.1% 
Material misstatements 7 3.1% 4 2.2% 8 5.8% 10 13.0% 5 10.0% 1 1.6% 3 3.4% 38 4.5% 
Other reasons (significant GCU) 2 0.9% 3 1.6% 2 1.4% 7 9.1% 2 4.0% 1 1.6% 8 9.1% 25 3.0% 
Total qualifications, within category 9 4.0% 9 4.9% 14 10.1% 20 26.0% 11 22.0% 4 6.5% 13 14.8% 80 9.6% 
       
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
    
Adverse opinion       
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
    
Material errors/omissions (general) 0 0.0% 9 4.9% 4 2.9% 5 6.5% 0 0.0% 3 4.9% 0 0.0% 21 2.6% 
Material errors/omissions (GCU) 0 0.0% 12 6.5% 4 2.9% 1 1.3% 0 0.0% 3 4.9% 1 1.1% 21 2.6% 
Total qualifications, within category 0 0.0% 21 11.4% 8 5.8% 6 7.8% 0 0.0% 6 9.8% 1 1.1% 42 5.2% 
       
 
  
 
  
 
  
   
    
Disclaimer of opinion   
          
    
Scope limitations 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 1.6% 2 2.3% 3 0.4% 
 
  
          
    
Total qualifications  224 100.0% 184 100.0% 138 100.0% 77 100.0% 50 100.0% 61 100.0% 88 100.0% 822 100.0% 
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 Table 3  
Descriptive statistics and univariate tests of continuous variables by audit opinion type. 
 
(1) Unqualified opinions 
(N=962)  
(2) Going-Concern 
opinions (N=171)  
(3) Other qualified 
opinions (N=334)  
Differences in 
mean 
(1)-(2) 
Differences in 
mean 
(1)-(3) 
Differences in 
mean 
(2)-(3) 
Variable Mean        SD  Mean         SD  Mean         SD  t-Statistic t-Statistic t-Statistic 
TA 0.004 0.098  -0.060 0.156 
 
0.012 0.105 
 
-5.256***   1.255*   -5.427*** 
DA 0.010 0.082  -0.047 0.147 
 
-0.002 0.093 
 
-4.969***    -2.440**   -2.761*** 
ROA 0.009 0.086  -0.267 0.599 
 
0.008 0.069 
 
-6.025***  -0.124*   -5.984*** 
TURN 0.648 0.782  0.319 0.380 
 
0.573 0.566 
 
-8.590***  -1.880*   -6.050*** 
INVREC 0.360 0.206  0.359 0.228 
 
0.376 0.205 
 
      -0.084  1.236      -0.859 
TLE 1.555 2.918  2.375 14.258 
 
1.565 1.897 
 
       0.750   0.260       0.652 
ZMJ -1.599 1.315  2.019 6.248 
 
-1.518 1.343 
 
  7.563***           1.026    7.309*** 
ARLAG 1.910 0.075  1.963 0.101 
 
1.909 0.082 
 
  8.091***   -0.150*    7.381*** 
AGE 1.065 0.306  1.176 0.312 
 
0.994 0.323 
 
  4.351***       -3.601***     6.057*** 
TA: total accruals divided by total assets; DA: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); ROA: net 
income divided by total assets; TURN: total sales divided by total assets; INVREC: inventory and accounts receivables divided by total assets; TLE: 
total liabilities divided by total equity; ZMJ: Zmijewski’s financial condition score (1984); ARLAG: natural logarithm of time lag (in days) between 
fiscal year end and the date of the audit report issue; AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was first listed on the ASE.  
    *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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 Table 4  
Chi-square tests of the discrete variables BIGN, LAO and LLOSS. 
Variable Unqualified  
(N=962) 
GC 
(N=171) 
Chi-square Unqualified  
(N=962) 
NGC 
(N=334) 
Chi-square GC 
(N=171) 
NGC 
(N=334) 
Chi-square 
BIGN          
(No) 741 154 15.289*** 741 283      8.972*** 154 283     2.990* (Yes) 221   17 221   51  17   51 
LAO          
(No) 752   43 195.519*** 752   50  419.602***   43   50     8.058*** (Yes) 210 128 210 284 128 284 
LLOSS          
(No) 728   46 159.574*** 728 263 1.548   46 263 128.100*** (Yes) 234 125 234   71 125   71 
BIG N: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; LAO: dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion in 
the previous year, 0 otherwise; LLOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 for a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise; GC: dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the audit opinion includes a going-concern qualification, 0 otherwise; NGC: dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit 
opinion includes a qualification except for going-concern, 0 otherwise. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level.  
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 5 
Logistic regression results of discretionary accruals and other control variables on 
qualified audit opinions - full sample. 
GCit  =  β0 + β1DAit + β2 BIGNit + β3ROAit + β4TURNit + β5INVRECit + β6TLEit + β7ZMJit + β8ARLAGit + β9AGEit +  
β10LAOit-1 + β11LLOSS it-1 + εit                                                                                                                                                         
 Expected Sign      GC Wald  test VIF 
Constant ? -19.585*** 13.741  
DA ?   -0.617   0.147 1.112 
BIG N -   -0.101   0.073 1.054 
ROA -   -6.773*** 14.655 1.815 
TURN -   -2.820*** 19.410 1.225 
INVREC +    1.385*   3.071 1.221 
TLE +    0.016   1.361 1.024 
ZMJ +    0.501*** 22.979 1.780 
ARLAG +    8.446***   9.812 1.169 
AGE -    0.524   1.093 1.142 
LAO +    2.512*** 77.317 1.062 
LLOSS +    0.876***   9.193 1.191 
     
Wald  430.460***   
Pseudo R 2    66.7%   
N    1,133   
NGCit  =  β0+ β1DAit + β2 BIGNit + β3ROAit + β4TURNit + β5INVRECit + β6TLEit + β7ZMJit + β8ARLAGit + β9AGEit  + 
β10LAOit-1 + β11LLOSS it-1 + εit                                                                                                                                                           
 Expected Sign   NGC Wald test   VIF 
Constant ? -3.997*      3.689  
DA ? -1.685*      3.125 1.153 
BIG N - -0.382*      3.353 1.070 
ROA - -0.153      0.011 1.759 
TURN + -0.109      0.553 1.330 
INVREC +   0.059      0.017 1.381 
TLE ?   0.005      0.015 1.396 
ZMJ -   0.041      0.246 1.995 
ARLAG +   0.831      0.614 1.132 
AGE - -0.158      0.343 1.166 
LAO +   3.040*** 288.019 1.043 
LLOSS +   0.054      0.063 1.232 
     
Wald  281.723***   
Pseudo R 2     43.0%   
N     1,296   
GC: dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion includes a going-concern qualification, 0 otherwise; NGC: 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion includes a qualification except for going-concern, 0 otherwise; 
DA: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); BIG N: dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; ROA: net income divided by total assets; TURN: total 
sales divided by total assets; INVREC: inventory and accounts receivables divided by total assets; TLE: total 
liabilities divided by total equity; ZMJ: Zmijewski’s financial condition score (1984); ARLAG: natural 
logarithm of time lag (in days) between fiscal year end and the date of the audit report issue; AGE: natural 
logarithm of the number of years since the firm was first listed on the ASE; LAO: dummy variable equal to 1 
for a qualified opinion in the previous year, 0 otherwise; LLOSS: dummy variable equal to 1 for a loss in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise. VIF: variance inflation factor. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level.  
***Significant at the 0.01 level.  
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Table 6  
Logistic regression results of discretionary accruals and other control variables on qualified 
audit opinions - distressed sample.  
 GCit  =  β0+ β1DAit + β2 BIGNit + β3ROAit + β4TURNit + β5INVRECit + β6TLEit + β7ZMJit + β8ARLAGit + β9AGEit + 
β10LAOit-1 + β11LLOSS it-1 + εit                                                                                                                                                                   
 Expected Sign       GC Wald test VIF 
Constant ? -22.365***   9.624  
DA ?   -1.732   0.993 1.166 
BIG N -   -0.058   0.021 1.052 
ROA -   -5.286***   8.330 1.839 
TURN -   -2.919*** 16.364 1.432 
INVREC +     0.865   0.960 1.428 
TLE +     0.015   1.133 1.025 
ZMJ +     0.566*** 24.028 1.772 
ARLAG +   10.081***   7.503 1.166 
AGE -     0.828   2.160 1.137 
LAO +     2.264*** 54.848 1.076 
LLOSS +     0.557*   3.135 1.164 
 
 
  
 
Wald  170.783***   
Pseudo R 2    63.2%   
N    671   
NGCit  =  β0 + β1DAit + β2 BIGNit + β3ROAit + β4TURNit + β5INVRECit + β6TLEit + β7ZMJit + β8ARLAGit + β9AGEit  + 
β10LAOit-1 + β11LLOSS it-1 + εit                                                                                                                                                                   
 Expected Sign         NGC    Wald test    VIF 
Constant ?  -0.012     0.000  
DA ?  -1.733     1.770 1.295 
BIG N -  -0.375     1.805 1.059 
ROA -   0.946     0.251 1.730 
TURN +  -0.332     1.330 1.520 
INVREC +  -0.215     0.114 1.685 
TLE ?  -0.006     0.020 1.313 
ZMJ -   0.140     1.816 1.951 
ARLAG + -1.029     0.402 1.108 
AGE -   0.008     0.000 1.146 
LAO +   2.824*** 147.146 1.057 
LLOSS + -0.058     0.054 1.206 
     
Wald  153.481***   
Pseudo R 2    39.6%   
N     687   
GC: dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion includes a going-concern qualification, 0 otherwise; 
NGC: dummy variable equal to 1 if the audit opinion includes a qualification except for going-concern, 0 
otherwise; DA: discretionary accruals estimated using the modified-Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995); BIG 
N: dummy variable equal to 1 if the auditor is Big 4, 0 otherwise; ROA: net income divided by total assets; 
TURN: total sales divided by total assets; INVREC: inventory and accounts receivables divided by total 
assets; TLE: total liabilities divided by total equity; ZMJ: Zmijewski’s financial condition score (1984); 
ARLAG: natural logarithm of time lag (in days) between fiscal year end and the date of the audit report 
issue; AGE: natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm was first listed on the ASE; LAO: 
dummy variable equal to 1 for a qualified opinion in the previous year, 0 otherwise; LLOSS: dummy variable 
equal to 1 for a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise. VIF: variance inflation factor. 
*Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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***Significant at the 0.01 level 
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